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BOOK REVIEWS
strict conditions precedent that must be satisfied before a court-martial
convened by a commander of one force, such as the Army, can try a
member of a different force, such as the Navy.19
Civilians Under Military Justice is a most worthy addition to the
literature on military law. I enjoyed reading it and, except for one
thing, would unhesitatingly recommend it as a worthwhile addition to
the reader's library. The thing that makes me stop short of the latter is
the price. I know the cost of printing is astronomical; and I don't pre-
tend to know how to price a work of art, but $11.50 impresses me as
being just too much. If the excellent color photograph of Thomas
Gainsborough's portrait of Sir Charles Gould, which appears as the
frontispiece, contributed to the cost, it would, in my view, have been
immeasurably better to have left it out. The present price is bound to
turn away many potential readers; I urge them to borrow the book from
the Library.
ROBERT E. QuiNN*
PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW. By JAY
KATZ, JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, AND ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ. New York: Free
Press, 1967. Pp. 785.
This book, an imposing work of some eight hundred rather large
pages, is broken down into two major sections (referred to by the
authors as chapters). Chapter One, entitled Psychoanalysis and Law-
Theories of Man, attempts to explore the relationships between tradi-
tional psychoanalytic theory and certain fundamental legal issues. The
second chapter, Law and Psychiatry, undertakes a fairly comprehensive
survey of laws involving mental disorder, with reference to such crucial
issues as involuntary commitment, definitions of insanity and incompe-
tence, and relationships between the courts and psychiatric practitioners.
The format of Chapter One consists mainly of selections taken from
standard psychoanalytic sources followed by notes of illustrative legal
case material and comments by judicial and psychiatric authorities.
Chapter Two is built around a number of selected legal cases, each
covered rather thoroughly, followed by related court decisions and
comments. In most instances, the authors allow their material to speak
19. United States v. Houston, 17 USCMA 280, 38 CMR 78 (1967); United States v.
Hooper, 5 USCMA 391, 18 CMR 15 (1955).
" Chief Judge, United States Court of Military Appeals.
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for itself, and inferences must be drawn by the reader. This is often
effective, but on occasion becomes difficult, particularly in Chapter One
where the relationships between psychoanalytic concepts and illustrative
legal material are sometimes obscure.
Any critical analysis of this book must deal with each chapter separate-
ly, which is consistent with the statement made by the authors that the
volume is really two books in one. The major difficulty in Chapter One
involves the clarity of the selected material itself as well as the occasional
uncertainty as to what inferences should be drawn from it. Freud him-
self is not especially easy to understand, particularly when discussing the
basic topographic and structural theories of psychoanalysis. It becomes
doubly difficuk, then, particularly for the psychoanalytic layman, to
attempt to relate these constructs based on the models of nineteenth
century physical science to modern problems of psychiatry and law.
It is probably significant in some way that just when the law is begin-
ning to lean rather heavily on psychoanalysis and its assumptions about
the nature of man, the rest of the world is rapidly revising or entirely
abandoning the Freudian position. One rarely sees these days, for ex-
ample, a case of conversion hysteria such as was commonly seen in
Freud's day. Instead of puzzling physical symptoms, today's psychiatric
patients are more likely to present vague complaints of unhappiness,
indecision, and lack of self-esteem, with emphasis on interpersonal
rather than intra-personal conflict. It is also noteworthy that insanity
(i.e., psychosis), the main legal-psychiatric issue dealt with in this book,
is s6mething about which traditional psychoanalysis has had relatively
little to say; relative, that is, to the psychoneuroses such as hysteria,
phobic ieactions, obsessions and compulsions.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that Freudian theory, for better or
for worse, has, more than any other force, helped to structure modem
psychiatric thinking and ultimately, the way we deal with those among
us whose behavior deviates from accepted normative standards. This is
particularly true in relation to the basic deterministic philosophy in-
herent in psychoanalysis, especially as it deals with the dynamics of the
unconscious and the apparently relentless rear guard action man must
constantly wage against his genetically based erotic and destructive
tendencies.
The second portion of this volume becomes more directly and deeply
involved in the extremely important matter of contemporary legal de-
cisions related to instances of behavioral disorder. Here one can see
1208 [Vol. 9:1195
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more clearly the assumptions at work in the courtroom, and, although
extremely interesting to the legal layman, the net result is a bit un-
settling as well. One gradually develops the uncomfortable feeling that
there is something terribly oppressive about the modem partnership of
forensic psychiatrist, judge, and attorney. Repeatedly throughout the
book, one sees individuals deprived of their freedom, their civil liberties,
and their right to be heard in court, because, it is alleged, they need
"treatment" for their mental condition and are unable to understand
the true nature of their circumstances. Such "treatment," it seems, often
consists of being locked up in an overcrowded and understaffed insti-
tution (euphemistically referred to as a "hospital") and little else. All
this is done, of course, under enlightened and humane conditions, very
modern and medically sound, "for the good of the patient." This hap-
pens in spite of the fact that there is practically no general agreement as
to what constitutes insanity or "mental illness," or in fact, what "treat-
ment" really is or ought to be. Thus, rather than being found guilty
of a criminal act, the individual becomes a patient instead of a criminal,
but nevertheless is "convicted" of having a "mental illness."
Dr. Thomas S. Szasz, a psychiatrist and practicing psychoanalyst,
comments on this matter as follows:
But if I use the word "schizophrenic" outside of my office or in a
courtroom it is a terrible thing. It is not the word-it is the con-
text in which you say it that matters.... So these diagnostic terms
have a tremendous social impact ... You are finished unless some-
body defends you. You can't stand trial, you have no rights, you
can't get out of the hospital.'
More than anyone else, Dr. Szasz has protested the practices of modern
forensic psychiatry. Interested readers would do well to examine an-
other of his writings, 2 in which he so capably points out the intellectually
and morally untenable position we have taken in regard to the issues
of criminal responsibility and mental disorder.
A major factor to be dealt with here is that forensic psychiatrists have
been playing the roles of judges, whether or not they realize it, for their
decisions concerning a person's mental condition often short circuit the
traditional Anglo-American process of justice. In many cases, it appears,
this is done to the detriment of the individual concerned. Psychiatric
1. SzAsz, PSYCmIATRC JVs'ncE 578 (1965).
2. SzAsz, LAW, LIBERTY, AND PSYcHIATRY (1963).
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testimony is accepted as being representative of modern medical and
scientific knowledge (similar to the court testimony of a pathologist,
toxicologist, or ballistics expert) in spite of the very obvious fact that
there are a multitude of viewpoints in the field, many of which are in
direct opposition to one another. At best, this state of affairs frequently
results in the miscarriage of justice; at worst, it threatens to undermine
our legal philosophy (including the adversary system) if not our entire
tradition of social order. These matters should be of the gravest concern
to those who practice law and psychiatry as well as to the enlightened
and concerned citizen. The authors of this book have done a respectable
job of collecting material that dramatizes these problems. One can
scarcely read through these cases, many of which include rather lengthy
transcripts, and not be impressed with the seriousness of the questions
that are raised and the confusion that is so often evident. One is also
impressed with how meager is the help given to the courts by the so-
called expert representatives of modern medical science.
Any book, compiled in this manner, is bound to reflect the biases of
the authors, and thus runs the risk of conflicting with those of its readers.
This is particularly true in the area of psychiatry and other disciplines
dealing with human behavior where biases abound and generally agreed
upon facts are few and far between. This reviewer, for example,
would have preferred to see the authors draw more heavily on the be-
havioral sciences in order to provide a broader basis for understanding
some of the current thinking about psychopathology.
As have Dr. Szasz and others, one might legitimately attack the entire
"illness model" of mental disorder as representing a throwback to de-
monology; a convenient myth which allows us to explain away the
complex problems human beings inevitably encounter as they live with
one another. The idea that "mental illness" is, as the phrase goes, "like
any other illness" is at face value, clearly absurd. There are almost
no similarities whatsoever. It is practically never observed, for ex-
ample, that physical illness can be legally construed as an excusing
condition for anti-social behavior. The medieval notion of demon
possession is no more illogical and far more humane than the idea
that there is such an entity as "mental illness." At least the afflicted
individual could, after successful exorcism, return to his previous
status without prejudice. This is certainly not the case with most
present day mental patients, who often suffer a lifelong stigma based
on the implicit assumption that their disorder represents some type
[Vol. 9:11951210
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of brain or nerve disease, suggesting a disgraceful taint which is basic-
ally irreversible. In its manner of conceptualizing the problem, the
illness model has not only captivated the legal-psychiatric partnership,
but has strongly shaped public attitudes, many of which have undergone
little change since the days of Kraepelin. 3
Some of the recent developments in the area of psychotherapy seem
promising enough to have been included, and may, in fact, end up
having the revolutionary impact on present day psychiatry that Freud's
methods had on the traditional neurology of the nineteenth century.
Also, practically untouched was the issue of socio-economic discrimina-
tion in relation to the main legal and psychiatric questions raised by the
authors. It has been repeatedly demonstrated that both the law and
psychiatry operate very selectively at times depending on the social
class of the person in question. It would seem that miscarriages of justice
via the psychiatric route would be as difficult, if not harder to rectify
as those occurring by means of the more traditional legal procedures
when persons of low status are involved. One gets the distinct feeling
that involuntary commitment often represents a convenient means
whereby these people, many of whom are clearly troublesome to so-
ciety, can be dispatched and forgotten. Perhaps a built-in mechanism
exists for handling whatever collective guilt might arise over such a
practice, since the assumption is that we are "treating" a sick man (albeit
against his will) rather than punishing a wrongdoer.
However, it is probably unfair to criticize a book for the viewpoints it
does not represent, particularly in that the biases of the authors are
frankly stated, or at least, unhidden. The book as a whole is an ad-
mirable effort to deal with an extremely complex but crucial set of
problems and should be an excellent sourcebook for lawyers, psychia-
trists, clinical psychologists, and others who work with the courts or are
in other ways involved with legal-psychiatric problems. In addition to
a subject index, there are tables of cases, authors, and sources consulted.
These, along with the condensed and analytical tables of contents, should
enable one to find his way through the book with relative ease.
It would seem that a book such as this is an especially welcome con-
tribution at a time of revitalized concern over civil liberties and the
rights of minorities, since mental patients have long been one of our
3. Emil Kraepelin (1855-1926). German psychiatrist who, more than anyone else,
helped establish the notion that mental disorders were physical diseases. A major as-
sumption was that such disorders were based largely on metabolic and hereditary ir-
regularities, and thus were usually incurable.
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most oppressed minority groups. Frightening to most and conveniently
ignored, their burden might be eased somewhat if we could face more
directly some of the destructive and hypocritical things we do to them
in the service of decent values such as justice, humanity, and health.
Perhaps this volume will in some way contribute to a more honest ap-
praisal of the whole area.
RUSSELL P. NORMAN*
* Associate Professoi of Psychology, College of William and Mary.
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